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Abstract 
The time is not only ripe but pressing for 
the EU and the states of the Western 
Balkans to recalibrate and reinforce the 
current pre-accession strategy. Trade 
policy should be moved beyond existing 
free trade commitments for all the 
Western Balkans to enter the customs union of the 
EU and Turkey. Eurozone doctrine should be 
adapted to realities. Rather than regarding the use 
of the euro by Montenegro and Kosovo as an 
unfortunate turn of events, the costs and benefits of 
unilateral adoption of the euro by not-yet member 
states of the region should be more openly 
appraised, and the option to ‘euroise’ recognised as 
a possibility. It is good that the EU has moved at the 
declaratory level towards visa ‘liberalisation’, 
which means scrapping visas rather than just 
‘facilitation’ measures. However the Commission 
has not yet published guidelines or timelines for 
this. The region should be put on track for access to 
the Structural Funds on terms and scales 
progressively approaching those from which new 
member states such as Bulgaria and Romania 
already benefit. The ratio of these aid receipts 
between the new member states and the Western 
Balkans is currently 4:1; the former are receiving 
more than they can handle efficiently, whereas the 
Western Balkans have huge unsatisfied needs. 
Overall the case is made for significant moves 
towards ‘functional membership’ of the whole of the 
region with the EU, which would be a highly useful 
advance, irrespective of how or when the EU 
overcomes its Lisbon Treaty hiatus. 
1.  The New Context 
The context for EU policy towards the Western 
Balkans has changed to the point that the time is 
now ripe for a new stage in the pre-accession 
process for the region. Positive momentum needs to 
be visibly reinforced, and there are possibilities to 
do so at the EU and regional level.   
At the regional level important changes in 2008 
have included the winding up of the Stability Pact 
and its replacement by the Regional Cooperation 
Council in Sarajevo, consisting of all the states of 
south-east Europe.  
Meanwhile Croatia’s accession negotiations 
continue to advance, having been switched to ‘go’ 
following the arrest and dispatch to The Hague of 
Ante Gotovina in 2005. 
Kosovo’s independence, declared in February, has 
been recognised 40 states in all, including 20 of the 
EU-27 and the US. While Russia has tried to block 
the EU from taking up a more important role there, 
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon in his report to 
the UN Security Council in June, invited the EU to 
go ahead with its crucial rule of law mission 
(EULEX) under a UN umbrella arrangement, which 
means delegated responsibility to get on with the 
job.
1 
In May the general elections in Serbia resulted in 
the formation of a pro-European government there, 
notwithstanding the developments in Kosovo. The 
EU and Belgrade signed a Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement (SAA) just before the 
elections, which means that all the Western Balkans 
                                                      
1 UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General 
on the United Nations Administration in Kosovo”, 12 
June 2008, S/2008/354. The Annex II to this report says: 
“In the absence of other guidance from the Security 
Council, and following extensive consultations, it is my 
intention to reconfigure the structure and profile of the 
international civil presence to one that corresponds to the 
evolving situation in Kosovo and that enables the 
European Union to assume an enhanced operational role 
in Kosovo, in accordance with resolution 1244” (1999).  
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except Kosovo now have these legal contracts with 
the EU. The new government in Belgrade moved 
rapidly with the arrest of Radovan Karadic and his 
dispatch to the International Criminal Court at The 
Hague. Karadic’s joining Gotovina in The Hague 
marks a welcome even-handedness in the treatment 
of Western Balkan war criminals.  
Further intentions to apply for membership are 
being announced by Montenegro before the end of 
2008, and by Serbia, whose new government also 
intends to apply by the end of the year. These two 
countries will presumably join Macedonia at some 
stage, as countries with candidate status but without 
initially a launch of accession negotiations.  
For its part the EU continues to re-affirm the full 
membership vocation of the entire region. At the 
same time the hiatus over the ratification of the 
Lisbon Treaty casts a shadow over these prospects, 
and notably leads President Sarkozy to say bluntly 
that there will be no further enlargement without the 
Lisbon Treaty. If Lisbon’s ratification is completed 
in 2009, the signing of a Treaty of Accession with 
Croatia could take place in 2010, with effective 
accession maybe in 2011. But beyond that there are 
no clear scenarios for who might be next and when.  
Meanwhile the August war between Russia and 
Georgia, raising questions over how Russia might 
next extend its coercive methods right up alongside 
the Balkans (in Moldova or Ukraine), adds to 
Russia’s current behaviour towards Serbia and 
Kosovo as a reason for the EU to strengthen its 
Balkan policies. 
Overall this new context poses two issues of 
strategy for the EU and Western Balkan states.  
The first is how the EU can sustain the positive 
momentum of developments in the region, even 
while the EU’s enlargement process seems likely to 
remain at best on ‘slow’, or at worst on ‘stop’, for 
some time. Could the EU go further than the current 
SAA process with the integration of Western Balkan 
states into the functioning of EU policies before 
membership? 
The second related question is whether the current 
mix of bilateralism versus regional multilaterism is 
quite right or not. The SAA process is essentially 
bilateral, with so far only some rather fragmentary 
elements of regional multilateralism.  
2.  The Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements 
Since the adequacy of the SAA process is at the 
heart of both these questions, let us first assess the 
facts. The SAAs are the formal framework of 
contractual relations between the EU and the 
individual states of the Western Balkans. They 
follow the same format, and in many articles have 
identical wording. The agreements are structured 
along the same lines as the long list of ‘chapters’ 
negotiated with accession candidates. The difference 
is that for accession candidates all chapters have to 
be brought to a state of legal compliance with the 
EU acquis, and proof of implementation; whereas 
the SAAs are more of a warming-up exercise, 
inviting the partner state to move gradually into 
compliance and otherwise to ‘cooperate’ in various 
domains. The table of contents of a specimen SAA 
(with Croatia) is presented in Annex A, together 
with brief comments on the content. 
Of the ten Titles, the first three on democratic 
principles, political dialogue and regional 
cooperation are in the nature of declarations of 
intent, without precise operational or legally binding 
content. However the reference to democratic 
principles and human rights in Article 2 states that 
they: “constitute essential elements of this 
Agreement”, which is Euro-code language for 
marking it out as the political condition for 
proceeding with the whole integration process.  
Title IV contains the main ‘red meat’, setting out the 
terms of a free trade agreement to be fulfilled within 
six years. Quantitative restrictions and some 
customs duties are abolished immediately, while 
other provisions are phased in over 3 to 6 years. 
Anti-dumping provisions and safeguard clauses 
remain in place. 
Title V goes through the other three economic 
‘freedoms’ of movement: for services, capital, and 
labour. However the content is far from reaching 
conditions of ‘freedom’. Services are to be 
liberalised progressively, but only starting after four 
years and in ways that are not specified. Legally 
employed workers shall not be discriminated 
against, but this certainly does not amount to 
freedom of movement. Some capital controls remain 
possible, although direct investment is free.  
Title VI on the approximation of laws and 
competition rules has considerable content under the 
broad heading of gradual approximation on the 
EU’s internal market acquis. Compliance with EU 
acquis is obligatory for competition rules, state aids, 
intellectual property rights and public contracts, 
either immediately or within 3 years. This amounts 
to a significant deepening of the free trade area.  
Title VII on justice and home affairs mainly 
involves ‘cooperation’, which means no binding or 
operationally defined content. The main ‘red meat’ 
here is the obligation to re-admit illegal migrants.  
Title VIII is called ‘Cooperation policies’, and is a 
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including some intentions to gradually adopt the EU 
acquis in areas such as agricultural standards. Issues 
of macroeconomic policy are dealt with in very 
cursory terms. 
Title IX announces the availability of EU financial 
assistance, but amounts are not specified here. 
Finally, Title X provides for the institutional 
structure, notably the Stabilisation and Association 
Council.  
Overall the operational and legally binding content 
of the SAAs consists mainly of a fairly deep free 
trade area, while the remaining extensive (or almost 
encyclopaedic) landscape of issues amounts to little 
more than sketching the agenda that will later have 
to take real shape in the process of accession 
negotiations. For countries like Croatia that are 
already well advanced in the accession negotiations, 
the passage from SAA to membership is an easy fit. 
For others with more remote prospects for the 
opening of negotiations, however, the question is 
how the SAA process might be boosted in order to 
enhance the momentum of Europeanisation.  
3. Trade  policies 
Although the free trade element is the most 
substantial part of the SAA, a re-think is needed. 
The question of why and how is illuminated in a 
recent study by the World Bank, which sheds 
important light on the nature of changes in trade and 
industrial structure that has been seen in the 
transitional integration of the new member states 
into the EU, compared to developments so far in the 
Western Balkans.
2 The findings have implications 
for the EU’s trade policy towards the Western 
Balkans.  
Already about 25 years ago, economic researches on 
the effects of completing the EU’s internal market 
established that intra-industry trade had become a 
major driver of economic growth and structural 
change in the European economy. Traditional trade 
theory mainly addressed the pursuit of comparative 
advantages for inter-industry, for example trading 
textiles for motor cars. By contrast intra-industry 
trade sees a complex pattern of trade in similar 
competing products, and of trade in parts and 
components in multi-stage production and supply 
chains, especially in the case of geographically close 
or directly neighbouring states. Intra-industry trade 
became for economists a new analytical paradigm, 
and for the EU it became the main source of new 
economic gains from market integration, and 
                                                      
2 S. Kathuria (ed.), Western Balkan Integration and the 
EU – An Agenda for Trade and Growth, World Bank, 
2008. 
justification of the EU’s ‘1992’ single market 
programme.
3  
Table 1. Trends in Trade in Parts and Components 
in the Western Balkans and new EU 
member states, 1996-2005 
 year  Exports  of 
P & C, 
$ millions 
Imports of 
P & C, 
$ millions 
P & C
as %
manufact. 
Exports
P & C
as % 
manufact. 
imports
Western 
Balkans 
1996 
2005 
416 
1,322 
945 
2,725 
7.9
10.7
8.9
9.3
Slovenia 1996 
2005 
954 
2,782 
890 
2,099 
12.7
16.4
12.4
13.8
Slovakia 1996 
2005 
659 
3,679 
836 
5,481 
11.0
13.7
12.7
21.3
EU new 
8 
1996 
2005 
7,702 
49,520 
11,277 
48,566 
12.2
19.8
13.8
19.3
Source: World Bank op. cit., pp. 43-44. 
The World Bank shows how the same intra-industry 
trade paradigm has been driving the economic 
progress of the new member states of central 
Europe, and how it has so far been little in evidence 
in the Western Balkans. Table 1 shows trade in parts 
and components (P & C) as illustrating the 
dimensions of ‘producer-driven supply chains’, with 
complex input-output relationships in industries 
across trading partner states, often involving direct 
investment. This contrasts with ‘buyer-driven 
supply chains’, in which large retailers create their 
supply networks typically without investment. The 
data show the very substantial growth of exports and 
imports of P & C in the 8 new continental member 
states of the EU acceding in 2005, with these 
exports multiplying in dollar terms 7 times, and 
imports 4 times, in the decade 1996 to 2005. Their 
share of total exports and imports of manufactured 
goods increased from around 13% to nearly 20%, 
thus accounting for a substantial part of trade 
growth. For a scale closer to that of the Western 
Balkans one may look at the cases of Slovenia and 
Slovakia among the new 8 member states. In 1996 
Slovakia saw export and import volumes of trade in 
P & C on roughly the same scale as the Western 
Balkans total; by 2005 Slovakia had jumped ahead, 
with levels of P & C trade tripling (for exports) or 
doubling (for imports) the totals for the Western 
Balkans. Meanwhile the share of Western Balkan 
trade in P & C in relation to the total for 
manufactured goods only increased modestly. 
The trade policy issue for the Western Balkans here 
revolves around a seemingly technical and 
bureaucratic choice between two options: 
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•  The first option is the actual policy course, 
according to which all Western Balkan states 
have made free trade agreements with the EU as 
part of their Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements. All have also joined in a renewed 
CEFTA system for multilateral free trade 
between each other, and plan to negotiate rules 
of origin agreements with the EU using the 
standard Pan-Euro-Med model regulation for 
this purpose. These rules of origin agreement 
permit ‘diagonal cumulation’ of value added 
between two or more stages of production in 
different countries sharing free trade agreements 
with each other and the EU, thus helping 
achieve the required minimum total value added 
in the free trade partner states to qualify for duty 
free import into the EU. Each stage of 
cumulation of value added between free trade 
partner states has to be supported by proof, with 
documentation certified by accredited agencies. 
This is burdensome for both enterprises and 
customs administrations, and a temptation for 
corruption.   
•  The second option would be for all the Western 
Balkans to enter into the customs union (of the 
EU, Turkey and Andorra), requiring that the 
Western Balkans adopt the EU’s common 
external tariff with third countries, in addition to 
complying with various standards for customs 
procedures. The advantage of the customs union 
over the first option is that there is no need any 
longer for the complicated rules of origin, with 
the especially complicated procedures for 
diagonal cumulation. In the customs union 
goods circulate freely, since any good entering 
from a third country will have borne the 
common external tariff. The benefit from 
scrapping the rules of origin procedures for 
trade between the EU and the Western Balkans 
would be especially important for the region 
given that it is a cluster of small states virtually 
surrounded by EU, and where complex 
structures of ‘producer-driven supply chains’ 
across these countries should develop.  
A further argument in favour of the customs union 
option follows on from the fact that all the Western 
Balkans would be doing is what is necessary in any 
case for accession, with the adoption of the common 
external tariff and administrative aspects of customs 
procedures. By contrast the first option requires an 
important investment in rules of origin procedures, 
only for these to be scrapped later as accession 
approaches.  
The development of intra-industry trade and 
producer-driven supply chains places a premium on 
clarity, simplicity and reliability of an open-trading 
regime, suitable for complex ‘just in time’ logistics. 
The business sector needs clear information, that 
can be reduced to credible branding, where country 
‘x’ can be regarded ‘as if’ in the EU internal market 
without any doubt or complicated qualification. The 
customs union provides this, whereas free trade with 
diagonal cumulation of value added does not. The 
customs union formula is an advantage not just for 
trade, but also for favouring foreign direct 
investment, which in turn is a major mechanism for 
stimulating intra-industry trade.   
With these major arguments so clearly in favour of 
the customs union option for the Western Balkans it 
seems odd that the European Commission does not 
favour it. One argument heard is that the customs 
union with Turkey has led to complications and 
tensions. More precisely Turkey has not always 
wanted to apply the EU’s common external tariff, 
which is a basic requirement of customs union.
4 
This is because Turkey is a major economy at the 
edge of the EU, with important trading and political 
relationships with Russia, the Middle East and 
Central Asia. However these arguments are not 
relevant for the Western Balkans, which are 
surrounded by the EU and much more dependent on 
it.  
The superiority of the customs union option is 
advocated in the key messages of the cited World 
Bank study, which on this point concludes: 
Benefits from EU and regional integration 
would be maximized by creating a ‘shadow 
customs union’ with the EU for industrial 
products. Currently CEFTA countries’ tariffs 
are higher and more dispersed than those of the 
EU, providing scope for trade diversion. It is 
suggested that all CEFTA countries (who are 
simultaneously adopting CEFTA and the trade 
components of their Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements) adopt EU MFN tariffs 
for industrial products. This would amount to 
creating a virtual customs union encompassing 
the Western Balkans and the EU…
5 
A final argument favouring this course of action 
concerns the problem of corruption of border 
controls and customs procedures. These are major 
problems in all of south-east Europe, as is well 
known. However the easing of customs procedures 
and scrapping rules of origin requirements for trade 
                                                      
4 For example Turkey made a free trade agreement with 
Georgia in 2007, which in principle is inconsistent with 
the customs union, since the EU has not granted free 
trade to Georgia (it is only evaluating the case for perhaps 
doing so).   
5 World Bank op. cit., p. xviii.  Recalibrating EU Policy towards the Western Balkans | 5 
within the enlarged customs union
6 would be a 
useful step in cutting the opportunities for border 
corruption.  
The dangers of floods of imports flowing illegally 
into the EU market from third countries via this 
enlargement of the customs union is particularly 
reduced, due to the fact that the Western Balkans, 
after Croatian accession, will be close to becoming 
an enclave within the EU. There will only be a few 
ports in Montenegro and Albania to control, and for 
this the EU could easily deploy some customs 
personnel to monitor and strengthen the customs 
services there.  
Responsibility for organising this re-calibration of 
policy should fall not only on the European 
Commission, but also the Western Balkan states 
themselves, and here the newly founded Regional 
Cooperation Council could play a key role. This is a 
quintessential task for the Council to take up, since 
it calls for a regional logic and consistency. 
4. Monetary  policies 
Inclusion into the euro area is one of the most potent 
mechanisms and symbols of European integration. 
The EU’s official doctrine is that only member 
states can accede to the euro area, and even after 
becoming a full member state there are further 
demanding conditions for acceptance into the euro 
area. These are the Maastricht criteria, namely that: 
•  The inflation rate has to be not higher than 1.5% 
above the average of the three best performing 
euro states 
•  The budget deficit should not exceed 3% of 
GDP 
•  The public debt should not exceed 60% of GDP, 
and  
•  The exchange rate should have remained stable 
within the exchange rate mechanism band of +/- 
2.5 % for two years 
•  The long-term interest rate should not exceed 
that of the three best inflation performing states 
by more than 2%.  
These conditions are being applied with great 
severity, as exemplified by the rejection of 
Lithuania’s entry into the eurozone in 2007, on the 
grounds that its inflation rate was 2.7%, 
                                                      
6 Leaving of course the EU’s standard rules of origin to 
be applied by the customs union states for imports from 
various partner states of the EU in free trade or 
preferential regimes. 
insignificantly higher than the 2.6% of the three 
reference countries.
7 
The EU institutions have taken a strongly negative 
view towards the unilateral adoption of the euro by 
non-member states as a matter of doctrine. However 
as an economic proposition there can be serious 
arguments in favour of unilateral euroisation (as 
also for dollarisation). The arguments are most 
strongly positive for economies that are very small, 
open and dependent on the EU (or US), and whose 
own monetary and financial governance may be 
weak, and poorly placed to resist short-term political 
pressures for populist policies. If the country’s own 
institutions are fragile and lack long-term credibility 
the economy will have to bear a risk premium on its 
interest rates, which will have a negative impact on 
investment and growth. If on the other hand the 
economy has adopted the euro (or dollar) as its 
currency, the temptation to indulge in unsustainable 
budgetary policies will be greatly dampened, since 
there will be no possibility to inflate away the 
burden of the public debt. Further, if the economy is 
to become totally integrated into the EU’s market 
there are synergetic reasons to add the single 
currency to the single market: the single currency 
eliminates exchange transaction costs, improves the 
transparency of cost accounting, and clinches the 
credibility of perceptions of the business community 
that the economy is effectively part of the EU.
8 
These are reasons why Montenegro opted to adopt 
the euro unilaterally in 2002, and why the UN and 
EU teams managing the economy of Kosovo saw no 
alternative to adopting the euro in 2002. Bosnia also 
has maintained a fixed exchange rate first with the 
DM and then with the euro, supported by a currency 
board mechanism, since independence. (Analogous 
reasons see Panama long benefitting from 
dollarisation, and more recently Ecuador since 
1999.) In addition Europe’s micro states – Andorra, 
Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican - have all 
adopted the euro with the EU’s assent. All of these 
except Andorra have even more favourable 
agreements with the EU to mint their own euro 
coinage within specified limits. 
Why then does the EU maintain a negative doctrine 
on unilateral euro-isation? The arguments presented 
                                                      
7 This was especially unjustified since all the transition 
economies are necessarily experiencing a ‘Belassa effect’ 
supplement to their inflation rates through the gradual 
alignment of domestic service prices on typical EU levels 
as income levels in the traded sectors rise. EU finance 
ministers from ‘old Europe’ evidently failed to take 
elementary courses in transition economics.  
8 See M. Emerson, D. Gros, A. Italianer, J. Pisani-Ferry 
and H. Reichenbach, One market, One Money, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990.   6 | Michael Emerson 
by the institutions seem to be fourfold. First it would 
deprive the economy of the exchange rate 
adjustment instrument; but this argument is of little 
force for small economies that are already largely 
euro-ised informally. Second it would perhaps 
tarnish the euro’s credibility, but after ten years of 
the euro this argument now lacks plausibility, 
especially since the non-member states are not 
represented on the board of the European Central 
Bank. Third, as a political morality story, newly 
acceding states should go through the same 
Maastricht tests as the founding fathers of the euro, 
but this condition could still apply (see below). 
Fourth, EU finance ministers do not want to be 
distracted by matters that for them are marginal, 
which is not a respectable argument.  
Since the weight of these negative arguments is thin 
to say the least, the EU would be justified in 
recalibrating its position as follows: 
•  With the whole of the region now clearly set on 
joining the EU market there are synergetic 
advantages to joining the single currency as well 
•  Western Balkan states should have the option to 
adopt the euro unilaterally if they so wish. 
The EU’s concern not to undermine the governance 
of the European Central Bank can be met by a rule 
that when an already euroised state accedes as a full 
member state it shall not be admitted to the board of 
the European Central Bank until and unless it has 
respected the Maastricht criteria.
9  
5. Structural  funds 
In this section data are presented for the hypothesis 
that the Western Balkans would be treated as 
member states for the purpose of allocating grant aid 
from the EU. Bulgaria and Romania as used as 
comparators. On questions of scale Bulgaria has 
about the same population as Serbia, and Romania 
has a somewhat larger population (21 million) than 
all 7 Western Balkans together (17.6 million).  
A first comparison may be made between the pre-
accession aid (under the ISPA, Sapard and Phare 
programmes) received by Bulgaria and Romania in 
2006 immediately before their accession, compared 
to that received (under the IPA programme) by the 
Western Balkans in 2007. On a per capita basis the 
Western Balkans were receiving around half the 
level of Bulgaria and Romania, although Kosovo 
and Montenegro were more generously treated than 
the others.  
                                                      
9As a technical adjustment of the rules prior euro-isation 
would be deemed to satisfy the exchange rate stability 
criterion. 
A second comparison may be made between what 
Bulgaria and Romania are expected to receive 
during the 2007-2013 budget period when the 
amounts per capita roughly triple compared to their 
last pre-accession amounts. During the same period 
the amounts of pre-accession aid for the Western 
Balkans increase a little but not much. As a result 
the disproportion between the new member states 
and the Western Balkans sees a huge jump, with 
Bulgaria and Romania receiving €162 and €183 
respectively per capita per annum, whereas the 
Western Balkans average €43. The proportions 
become thus a little over 4:1. 
In monetary terms the Western Balkans are 
currently due to receive around €765 million per 
annum on average. If they were treated on a par with 
the two new member states the bill for the EU 
budget would increase by about €2 billion to around 
€2.7 billion. 
Table 2. Pre-accession and structural fund aid from 
the EU to South-East Europe 
  Population,
million 
€ 
million 
€ per 
capita 
€ million € per 
capita 
  2006 2006  2007-13
Annual 
average
2007-13
Annual 
average
Bulgaria 7.7 509  66  1,250 162
Romania 21.3 1015  47  3,900 183
    
  2007 2007  2011 2011
Croatia 4.5 133  29  157 35
Macedonia 2.0 55  27  98 48
Albania 3.6 57  27  95 26
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina.
4.0 58  14  108 27
Montenegro 0.6 29  48  34 56
Serbia   7.6 178  23  202 26
Kosovo 1.8 64  35  68 38
Western 
Balkans 7 
17.6 612  34.7  765 43
Source: European Commission 
However this budgetary story is not yet complete. 
The above data do not include receipts from the 
agriculture fund for Bulgaria and Romania since 
their accession in 2007, but also their contributions 
to the EU budget. In net terms this probably means 
further net budgetary gains for the new member 
states. For the present purpose, however, it is 
supposed that the Western Balkan states would not 
be integrated into the financial mechanisms of the 
Common Agricultural Policy before accession. 
With this exception the hypothesis retained here is 
that the Western Balkan states could be offered a 
path for progressive increases in structural aid from 
the EU towards the levels granted to the new 
member states from the Structural Funds. The 
conditions to be respected for moving along this 
path would first require agreement by the region to Recalibrating EU Policy towards the Western Balkans | 7 
join the customs union of the EU and Turkey. This 
would be consistent with the logic of the original 
decision under the Delors Commission to 
accompany completion of the internal market with 
expansion of the structural funds to aid adjustment 
processes. Secondly, there would have to be 
credible programmes for improving judicial systems 
and reducing corruption. As the current Bulgarian 
example has shown, the use of EU funds provides 
mechanisms for auditing financial practices in 
public and private sectors, and for intervening 
forcefully at the political level when abuses are 
observed. Further, the Bulgarian and Romanian 
experiences underline the importance of using 
conditional EU funding before accession to secure 
anti-corruption and judicial reforms before 
accession, given that the leverage of this 
conditionality is so much more effective before 
accession. 
6.  Movement of people 
The European Council agreed in June 2008 to 
advance to a new stage towards the freedom of 
movement of people between the Western Balkans 
and the EU, using the expression ‘visa 
liberalisation’ (meaning scrapping visas). The 
intention now is for the Commission to prepare 
roadmaps for the conditions for this to be achieved. 
There has already been a set of ‘visa facilitation’ 
agreements with Western Balkan states, but these 
have been criticised as remaining heavily restrictive 
and burdensome. The Regional Cooperation Council 
should work on the elimination of all remaining 
intra-Western Balkan visa restrictions.  
The Bulgarian and Romanian accessions, which 
were preceded by the scrapping of visas with the 
EU, have intensified the tensions over remaining 
restrictions for the Western Balkans, since the 
enlargement meant new visa restrictions between, 
for example, Macedonia and Bulgaria. As a result 
there has been a strong rise in evasive practices, like 
the acquisition of Bulgarian citizenship by many 
Macedonians, as well as the continuing process of 
Moldovans acquiring Romanian citizenship. 
Kosovo is presumably now proceeding to issue its 
own passports, which should be accepted by all EU 
states, not just those which have recognised its 
independence (which would be following the 
Taiwan model for countries that have not been 
recognised).  
The key question for the Commission now, and of 
course for EU member states in the Council, is how 
they specify the conditions and timelines for 
scrapping visas. Presumably there will be an agenda 
concerning the security quality of passports and 
systems of cooperation with security services, 
including the Schengen information system for 
‘black-listed’ persons. There will surely be 
arguments about how far the Western Balkan states 
should go in improving the general state of law 
enforcement and reduction of criminality as pre-
conditions, but here a counter-argument needs to be 
taken into account, namely that visa restrictions that 
are difficult to enforce become a source of 
criminality and illegal trafficking.  
7.  Energy and transport communities 
The Energy Community Treaty was signed on 25 
October 2005 by the EU and all the Western 
Balkans, including Kosovo represented by UNMIK. 
While limited in scope to the electricity and gas 
sectors, it represents a significant systemic 
development for EU policy in the Balkans in two 
respects. First it jumps ahead of the bilateralism of 
the SAA process by being multilateral between the 
EU and all the Western Balkans equally at the same 
time. Second, it involves legally binding compliance 
with the EU acquis in the sectors in question for all 
parties, both for existing EU law and for further 
adaptations of it that may follow later; in this 
respect it is following the model of the European 
Economic Area, but just for the sectors in question. 
The treaty establishes an institutional structure, with 
a separate secretariat in Vienna.  
A key feature of the Treaty is the accession of all the 
Western Balkans to the EU’s electricity grid system 
organised under the Union for the Coordination of 
Transmission of Electricity (UCTE), with the 
physical connection of South Eastern Europe to the 
EU’s grid achieved already in October 2004, 
following MoUs signed in 2002 and 2003. 
This model of complete regional-multilateral 
integration with the EU invites reflection on the 
optimal balance to be followed, as the Western 
Balkan integration process advances, between the 
bilateralism of the SAA and accession negotiations, 
and this regional multilateralism for virtual 
membership on account of specific policies. While 
both models are surely going to persist in 
complementary roles in the pre-accession period, 
this energy policy development may be initiating a 
model that deserves wider application. 8 | Michael Emerson 
Box 1. Summary features of the Energy Community Treaty 
-  Members: the EU and all the Western Balkans, including Kosovo (UNMIK) 
-  Implementation within twelve months of EC energy Directives for:  
the internal market for electricity (2003/54/EC),  
the internal market in natural gas (2003/55/EC),  
access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity (1228/2003EC) 
-  Implementation of EC environment directive for: 
the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (97/11/EC) 
the sulphur content of certain liquid fuels (1999/32/EC) 
emissions of certain pollutants into the air from large combustion plants (70/409EEC) 
on the conservation of wild birds (79/409/EEC) 
-  Implementation within one year of EC Directives for: 
electricity produced from renewable energy sources 9(2001/77/EC) 
use of bio-fuels and other renewable fuels for transport (2003/30/EC) 
-  Competition policy rules of Articles 81, 82 and 87 of the EC Treaty to be respected 
-  Compliance within one year with EC standards for energy transmission, as issues by: 
European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) 
European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (CENELEC) 
Union for the Coordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) 
European Association for the Streamlining of Energy Exchanges (EASEEGAS) 
-  Customs duties and quantitative restrictions prohibited for Network Energy trade 
-  Safeguard measures temporarily allowed in even of sudden crisis in Network Energy market 
-  Regulatory board for EC acquis implementation: 
with European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) 
 
In fact the Commission envisages furthering the 
energy community model in the land transport 
sector. The European Council in June 2008 
endorsed the Commission’s proposal to go ahead 
along these lines. Presumably this will concern 
regulatory policies in this sector, although it might 
also build on the existing programmes for Trans-
European Corridors of infrastructure investment. 
For example there is still no plan to extend Croatia’s 
new highway into a complete Adriatic highway, 
which is badly needed to disenclave Montenegro 
and Albania before reaching Greece. 
The Commission has already been negotiating with 
the Western Balkans accession to the Single 
European Sky. This follows a slightly different 
model, with parallel bilateral negotiations with each 
state of the region. There have already been 
impressive developments in the network of low cost 
airline connections between the EU and South East 
Europe which are of transformative importance.
10 
                                                      
10 For example German Wings, which links several 
German cities with all the capitals and major tourist 
destinations of South East Europe.  
8.  The Serbia-Kosovo recognition 
problem 
The point is often made that Serbia cannot accede to 
the EU without recognising Kosovo’s independence, 
which would contradict Serbia’s present 
constitution. And even the new government refuses 
to countenance recognition. In addition Kosovo 
could not accede without being recognised by all 
member states and thence by the EU itself. Beyond 
legalisms there is also the need for Belgrade and 
Pristina to find a way of cooperating over their 
respective minorities, not only the Serbs in Kosovo, 
but also the ethnic Albanians in Southern Serbia. So 
there is a situation still to be tidied up legally and 
functionally.  
For the time being politicians can wait for emotions 
to calm down, with no need for the EU to push 
Belgrade on the issue of recognising Kosovo. In due 
course realities may become increasingly accepted, 
and the issue of recognition may descend to the 
level of finding some accommodating form of 
words that is acceptable to all sides.  
As an example of legal-political ingenuity of the 
kind needed here, a former UN special 
representative for Kosovo advanced the ‘German 
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Federal Republic’s constitution could only embrace 
the whole of the post-war German territory, yet both 
the FRG and the DDR were at the same time 
member states of the United Nations. Another 
example of diplomatic accommodation of the 
irreconcilable was seen with the Liechtenstein 
imbroglio of 2005.
11 
There is time for the resolution of the Serbia-
Kosovo imbroglio, before the accession of either or 
both. In the meantime there are practical matters to 
be properly ordered. One example now is the export 
of petroleum products from Serbia duty free into 
Northern Kosovo, which results in new flows of 
traffic just to fill up with duty free petrol, and move 
illegally across corruptly administered frontiers.
12 
9.  Recalibrating conditionalities  
For some time now independent analysts have been 
pointing out confusions in the EU’s application of 
political conditionalities in the Western Balkans. 
For example Othon Anastasakis argues: 
The Western Balkan region reveals special 
trends in the EU’s handling of the strategy of 
political conditionality, and some creeping 
contradictions and dangers are beginning to 
show the limits of conditionality. More 
specifically the EU: 
(a)  is adding further, yet necessary, political 
conditions and criteria to weaker or more 
reluctant partners, and emphasises the 
journey rather than the outcome of 
accession, affecting the credibility of the 
instrument, 
(b)  it blends together normative, functional and 
realpolitik claims in the choice of its 
conditions, affecting the clarity of its 
intentions, 
                                                      
11 Another formula for accommodating realities was 
devised over the extension of the European Economic 
Area (EEA) to include the new member states in 2005. 
The EEA enlargement Treaty required that Liechtenstein 
recognise all EU member states, whereupon it was 
discovered that Liechtenstein has not recognised the 
Czech Republic or Slovakia because of an unresolved 
dispute over the uncompensated expropriation at the end 
of the Second World War of some real estate owned by 
the ruling prince of Liechtenstein. The hiatus was 
eventually resolved by an exchange of declarations and 
statements accompanying the signing of the EEA 
enlargement Treaty. 
12 This is reminiscent of Andorra’s specialisation in 
contraband tobacco exports until a couple of decades ago, 
when the abuse was brought under control following 
pressures from France and Spain. 
(c)  it pursues, in some cases, a rigorous 
assessment of compliance and, in other 
cases, a more adaptable and pragmatic 
assessment for the sake of preserving peace 
and avoiding insecurity risks, affecting the 
consistency of the process.
13 
Similar critiques are made by Gergana Noutcheva, 
who shows that EU policy in the Western Balkans 
has often been driven more by security concerns 
than its internal norms and rules of governance, and 
thus created confusion and compliance problems for 
its alleged conditionalities.
14  
In response to these critiques the following 
clarification of EU conditionality policy is 
proposed, as part of the scheme already set out 
above for four main blocks of policy – trade, the 
euro, visas and the structural funds. For these four 
blocks of policy the emphasis is on functional 
conditionality.  
For the extension of the EU-Turkey customs union 
to the Western Balkans the basic functional 
condition should be the application of the common 
external tariff (and various technical customs 
procedures).
15 
For agreeing to visa-free travel the conditions 
should again be strictly functional, and concern the 
security quality of passports and cooperation 
arrangements such as with the Schengen 
Information System.   
For increased volumes of structural aid the 
conditions should again be functional, linked to 
agreement on joining the customs union of the EU 
and Turkey, and the adequacy of financial control 
and anti-corruption policies.  
As for euroisation before accession, this would be 
essentially a unilateral move freely chosen by 
individual countries, with the Maastricht criteria 
held over as conditions for accession later to the 
governing board of the European Central Bank.  
                                                      
13 Othon Anastasakis, “EU political conditionality in the 
Western Balkans: New trends and challenges”, paper 
presented to the EKEM Delphi conference on the Return 
of the Balkans, 12-13 September 2008.  
14 Gergana Noutcheva, Fake, partial and Imposed 
Compliance - The limits of the EU’s Normative power in 
the Western Balkans, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 274, July 
2007. 
15 Currently the Netherlands is blocking the activation of 
the interim agreement for the trade policy provisions of 
the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia 
until two further indicted war criminals have been 
arrested and sent to the ICTY at The Hague, which is an 
example of confused or poorly sequenced conditionality. 10 | Michael Emerson 
Pure political conditionality, relating to the quality 
of democratic governance, should be essentially 
reserved for the final decision on whether the 
country is to be admitted as a full member state. 
This is what is relevant for the functioning of the 
governing institutions of the EU. This political 
conditionality should not be used in graduations 
mixed up with the scheme of functional 
conditionalities proposed for the four blocks of 
policy, since it is this which causes confusions at 
present. In the event of egregious relapse into 
undemocratic or otherwise gravely objectionable 
political behaviour (abuse of human rights, the use 
of force towards minorities or other countries, etc.) 
the SAA process should be suspended. 
10. Conclusions 
The new context makes the time ripe for the EU and 
the states of the Western Balkans to look again at 
the current pre-accession strategy for the region 
based on the SAA process. 
The SAA process itself is more symbolic than 
substantial, apart from commitments to implement 
free trade. It is otherwise very long on vague 
intentions to cooperate, which lack political or 
economic muscle.  
The case is therefore made for significant moves 
towards functional integration of the whole of the 
region with the EU, which can amount to a 
considerable degree of ‘functional membership’ that 
could be achieved irrespective of how or when the 
EU overcomes its Lisbon Treaty hiatus.  
The existing set of free trade commitments should 
be replaced by a collective move of all the Western 
Balkans into the customs union of the EU and 
Turkey, thus making an uninterrupted economic 
space across the EU and the whole of South East 
Europe. This is a far more advantageous proposition 
that the present intentions to supplement the existing 
free trade commitments with a complex rules of 
origin procedures (for diagonal cumulation), which 
would in any case be scrapped later upon accession. 
Problems of smuggling products such as tobacco 
and petrol should be countered by the adoption of 
the EU’s harmonised minimum excise duties 
throughout the region. 
Eurozone doctrine should be adapted to realities. 
Rather than regarding the use of the euro by 
Montenegro and Kosovo as unfortunate moves, the 
costs and benefits of unilateral adoption of the euro 
by not-yet member states of the region should be 
more openly appraised. Unilateral euroisation 
should be recognised as a possible option, but not an 
obligation. The usual Maastricht criteria could, with 
minor technical adjustments, still be used after 
accession as pre-conditions for entering into the 
governance of the eurozone.  
It is positive that the energy and transport sectors 
are the subject of actions (already taken or now 
proposed) to integrate the whole of the Western 
Balkans into these EU policies. This makes it all the 
more anomalous that the EU’s trade and monetary 
policies towards the region lag behind, depriving the 
region’s economies of synergetic benefits between 
the whole set of economic policies. This anomaly 
reflects a lack of coherence across the 
Commission’s various departments. 
It is also positive that the EU has moved at the 
declaratory level towards visa ‘liberalisation’, which 
means scrapping visas rather than the so-called 
‘facilitation’ measures. However the Commission 
has not yet published any guidelines or timelines for 
this. Presumably there will be requirements for 
various security standards in passports, and 
cooperation with EU security services; but 
otherwise this decision of principle to scrap visas 
should be put onto a fast track, since it is central to 
the aspirations of the people of the region.  
The region could be put on track for access to the 
Structural Funds on terms and scales progressively 
approaching those from which new member states 
such as Bulgaria and Romania already benefit; for 
the time being the ratio is 4:1 more favourable for 
the new member states. Drawing on the EU’s recent 
experiences of gross corruption in the use of EU 
funds in these new member states there should be 
conditions for major increases in the volume of aid 
in the Western Balkans, including programmes to 
improve judiciaries and the implementation of anti-
corruption standards.  
This overall recalibration of EU policies towards the 
Western Balkans would see an adjustment in the 
sequencing of conditionality and incentive 
structures. Today access to EU policies is largely 
conditioned on full accession and the associated 
political conditionality of the Copenhagen criteria, 
even if some exceptions are being introduced (e.g. 
for energy and transport). The foregoing proposals 
favour increased participation in EU policies before 
accession, with increased regional multilateralism in 
this process, and more clearly defined functional 
conditionality. This still leaves, however, the final 
test of conformity with all the Copenhagen criteria 
before accession. 
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Annex A. Summary features of the EU-Croatia Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
13 December 2004 
Title I – General principles 
- Respect for democratic principles and human rights 
- Six year implementation 
Title II – Political dialogue 
Title III – Regional cooperation 
- Cooperate with other SAA states, including free trade agreements 
Title IV – Free movement of goods 
Chapter I - Industrial products 
- free trade in maximum of six years 
- quantitative restrictions abolished immediately 
- customs duties abolished immediately, but for selected products phased out over 3 to 6 years 
- special protocols for textiles and steel 
Chapter II – Agriculture and fisheries 
- quantitative restrictions abolished immediately 
- EU abolishes customs duties immediately, with exceptions 
- Croatia abolishes customs duties progressively 
- special protocol for wines ands spirits 
- for fisheries protective measures possible if serious market disturbance 
Chapter III – Common provisions 
- standstill prohibiting new customs duties, and fiscal discrimination 
- anti-dumping provision 
- general safeguard clause in event of serious injury or market disturbances 
Title V – Movement of workers, establishment, supply of services, capital 
Chapter I - Movement of workers 
- no discrimination in treatment of legally employed Croatian or EU workers respectively 
Chapter II – Establishment 
- treatment no less favourable than own companies or any third country 
- right to employ key personnel of Croatian or EU nationality respectively 
Chapter III – Supply of services 
- freedom to supply cross border services to be allowed progressively after four years  
- special protocol for road transport, progressive harmonization of EU acquis 
Chapter IV – Current payments and movement of capital 
- direct investments free 
- real estate purchase in Croatia to be liberalized after four years 
- after four years determine modalities for full liberalization 
Chapter V – General provisions 
- if serious balance of payments difficulties, restrictive measures possible 
Title VI – Approximation of laws and competition rules 
- gradual approximation, especially on fundamental elements of Internal Market acquis 
- competition: respect Articles 81, 82, 86 and 87 of  Treaty (EU acquis) 
- state aid schemes: align within three years 
- intellectual property rights: align on EU acquis within three years 12 | Michael Emerson 
- open public contracts within three years 
- standardisation: gradual achievement of conformity 
- consumer protection: alignment on EU acquis encouraged 
Title VII – Justice and home affairs 
- rule of law: cooperate over reinforcement of institutions 
- visa, border control, asylum, migration: cooperate 
- illegal migration: obligation of re-admission 
- money laundering: cooperate 
- illicit drugs: cooperate 
- criminal matters: cooperate 
Title VIII – Cooperation policies 
- economic policy: gradual approximation on policies of Economic and Monetary Union 
- statistics: cooperate towards EU acquis 
- financial services: cooperate to improve supervision and regulation 
- investment promotion and protection: cooperate 
- industrial cooperation: aimed at modenisation 
- tourism: cooperate 
- customs: approximation on EU acquis 
- taxation: cooperate 
- social security and employment services: cooperate 
- agriculture: gradual harmonization on EU veterinary and phytosanitary acquis   
- education and training: cooperate 
- culture: cooperate 
- audio-visual field: harmonise on EU acquis 
- telecommunications: align on EU acquis immediately 
- information society: cooperate 
- transport: development Trans- and Pan-European corridors 
- energy: develop regulatory framework in line with EU acquis 
- nuclear safety: cooperate 
- environment: cooperate, with continuous approximation on EU standards 
- research and development: cooperate 
- regional and local development: cooperate e.g. over cross-border regions 
Title IX - Financial cooperation 
- grants and loans to support the Stabilisation and Association process 
Title X Institutional and final provisions 
- Stabilisation and Association Council to supervise the agreement, and resolve disputes 
- Parliamentary Committee establishes with European Parliament and Croatian members 
- agreement concluded for unlimited period 
- Interim Agreement: allows entry into force of free trade provisions before ratification completed 
 